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Editor's Note 2005: Since this article was compiled over a
decade ago, the TNI-AU suffered the indignity of a US embargo, post
Timor, a change of regime, and more recently acquired a lead in batch
of two Sukhoi Su-27SK and two Su-30MK, with a stated intent to field up to
fifty Sukhois. Russian reports also claim an interest in acquiring the
S-300PMU-2 (SA-10D) or later strategic SAM systems.
The Republic of Indonesia is
Australia's closest and often least understood neighbour. The largest Muslim
nation in the world, Indonesia is a secular nation state comprised of a
diverse range of ethnic minorities, populating an archipelago spread over an
area approaching half that of our own continent.
Given Indonesia's proximity to
Australia, the question of Indonesia's air capability will be asked. There is
a good reason for Australia to ask this question. This is because the
Indonesian archipelago is geographically the gateway to Australia, and any
hostile invader moving in from the North will have to secure Indonesia before
assaulting the Australian mainland. The Indonesians' ability to defend their
territory from such an invasion is of major importance as Indonesia becomes a
direct buffer zone between Australia and the advancing enemy (eg Japan in
WW2). Timor is the nearest readily accessible land mass from which tactical
aircraft can hit the Australian mainland, and as a staging area can be said
to be the stepping stone to Australia.
Tentara Nasional Indonesia -
Indonesia's Armed Forces
Indonesia's path to the present has
been politically turbulent, the Indonesian state finding its origins in the
Japanese military administration of WW2 which has had a profound influence in
the formation of this nation. The ethos of Japan's wartime military state,
characterised by political and economic structures permeated with military
personnel, produced a model which as historical circumstance would have it,
ultimately became much of the mold in which the current Indonesian state is
formed.
The Indonesian state separated from
the Netherlands in the late forties, after a bitter struggle for
independence. Indonesia, under the leadership of the charismatic Sukarno,
embraced the non-aligned/pro-Soviet posture which was fashionable in the
Third World during the fifties and sixties, this resulting in much military
aid being supplied from the Communist Bloc, this including aircraft and SA-2
SAMs.
Political alignment with the
communists had its price and this reflected in Sukarno's policy toward his
neighbours, namely Malaysia, Australia and Singapore. By the early sixties
political posturing had escalated to low level raids against Malaysian
territory, in a campaign known as 'Confrontasi' or confrontation. Australia
and Britain resisted the would be territorial expansion which never
eventuated, but has left a lasting mistrust of Indonesia in the region.
By the mid sixties Indonesia had by
any standards a respectable air capability with no less than 22 Tu-16
Badgers, 10 Il-28 Beagles, 35 MiG-21 Fishbeds, 40 or so MiG-17 Frescos and
MiG-15UTI trainers and a range of Soviet built troop transports. This
capability was arrayed against a RAAF equipped with Sabres and Canberras, and
the period saw a perception develop in this country of Indonesia being a
formidable opponent in any air war. That perception persists to this very
day, unjustifiably so.
Sukarno's flirtation with the
communists, the PKI, reached a head in the mid sixties, when he became
involved in a coup against the politically influential military (TNI-Tentara
Nasional Indonesia). The ultimate intention of the coup was to strip the TNI
of its powers and role in wider government. The coup failed and the TNI
proceeded in turn to mercilessly slaughter several hundred thousand
communists and perceived communist sympathisers. The scale and ferocity of
this campaign has few parallels.
The fall of the communists saw the
end of support for the TNI-AU's Soviet built aircraft, which began to suffer
ongoing serviceability problems with the lack of spares and maintenance
support. Eventually the aircraft were put into storage and some scrapped.
Indonesia turned to the West for
military hardware, acquiring much of their inventory under a range of aid
programs. In February, 1973, the TNI-AU began to receive ex-RAAF Commonwealth
Avon Sabres, all Mk.32s, which equipped No.14 Sqn based at Iswahjudi, near
Maduin in Eastern Java. These aircraft were supplemented by two other combat
squadrons, one with 14 F-51D Mustangs and the other with 16 Rockwell OV-10F
Broncos. Indonesia's economy could not support a capability beyond this, a
long range offensive air capability could not be sustained without direct
support from a superpower.
The seventies and eighties saw modest
but sustained growth in capability, with Indonesia acquiring a diverse range
of aircraft for transport, maritime recce and tactical roles. The Indonesians
wisely have chosen to invest in aviation manufacturing infrastructure, rather
than platforms. At this time they are assembling with partial manufacturing
of components NBO-105, NBK-117, NAS-332 Super Puma, Bell 214SP helicopters,
and CN-235 and NC-212 Aviocar twin engine transports, with full domestic
manufacture of the CT7-9C turboshaft engine by the end of this year.
Indonesia's domestic manufacturing program includes components for the F-16.
The TNI-AU
Indonesia's air force, the TNI-AU, is
split into two operational commands. The Western command, KOOPSAU1, is
headquartered in Jakarta, the Eastern command, KOOPSAU2, is headquartered in
Ujung Pandang on the West coast of Celebes. At this time Indonesia is still in
the process of creating its integrated air defence network, and is reported
to have acquired two Plessey EW/GCI radars, most probably AR-325s, to
supplement the existing 14 Thomson-CSF TRS-2215/2230 radars in service. The
air defence system will be controlled from a central hardened site at Halim
near Jakarta.
Most of Indonesia's air capability is
based in Java, which is the most densely populated island of the group, where
most of the nation's industrial infrastructure is based. The numerically
strongest part of the TNI-AU is its transport force, which in times of crisis
would be further augmented by Garuda's and Merpati's substantial fleets of
transport aircraft.
The heavy lift component of the
TNI-AU is provided by 31 Skwadron, equipped with geriatric C-130B aircraft
and a pair of pod equipped KC-130B tankers, and 32 Skwadron, flying a mix of
newer C-130H, stretched C-130H-30s and an L-100-30. The C-130s are based out
of Halim near Jakarta, and Malang in Eastern Java. These are supplemented by
a diverse fleet of medium lift transports which is at this time undergoing a
substantial modernisation with the progressive introduction of domestically
built IPTN CN.235M transports.
The numerically most common medium
lift transport is the locally built Nurtanio/CASA NC.212 Aviocar, a 14,000 lb
class STOL twin, flown by the composite 2 and 4 Skwadrons based at Halim and
Malang. The TNI-AU follows a practice uncommon in Western air forces, of
flying composite squadrons with multiple types. The Halim based 2 Skwadron
flies a mix of NC.212, C-47 and several Fokker F-27-400M, and the final
survivor of three Shorts Skyvans. With the introduction of the CN.235 it is
likely that the older types will be progressively retired.
The TNI-AU also operates a diverse
fleet of light transports and liaison aircraft, mainly Cessnas of types more
often seen in GA, but also including some Otters and a number of domestically
built PZL-104 Wilgas, a Polish design reminiscent of the Fi-156 Storch. A VIP
flight operates a Boeing 707-320C and a Lockheed Jetstar 6, based out of
Halim.
Heavy rotary wing lift is also the
domain of the TNI-AU, which has a respectable capability with no less than a
dozen S-58Ts (eq. Wessex 60 series), ten SA.330 Pumas and a growing number of
AS.332 Super Pumas, which are being assembled by IPTN. The larger helos are
supplemented by about 40 smaller types, including the AB-204 (UH-1), locally
assembled MBB Bo-105 and imported Hughes 500.
Indonesia is a maritime nation and
this reflects in a substantial by regional standards capability in the area.
Three Boeing 737s with Motorola SLAR systems were acquired, these are
reported to be in refit at this time, they are supplemented by a C-130H-MP.
Several Grumman HU-16 amphibians were operated in the SAR role, but the status
and service ownership of these aircraft is unclear. Reports suggest they will
be replaced with a newer type, possibly the CL.215T.
Basic pilot training is carried out
on the Swiss built AS.202 Bravo at the TNI-AU academy at
Djokjakarta-Adisjutjipto in South Eastern Java. Student pilots then progress
to the Beech T-34 Turbo-Mentor and then to the BAe Hawk 53, which serves the
dual role purpose of interdiction and close air support (CAIRS).
The sharp edge of Indonesia's air
capability is somewhat blunt. The most capable type in the inventory are a
dozen F-16A and dual control F-16B aircraft. The aircraft are to Block 15 OCU
(Operational Capability Upgrade) standard, fitted with P&W F-100-PW-100
23,800 lb thrust fans and upgraded older AN/APG-66 radar. The OCU is an
upgrade applied to older USAF and NATO airframes and FMS exports new build
and refurbished, and involves the upgrading of the radar and the weapon
system software, installation of higher performance fire control and stores
management computers, installation of a data transfer unit and fitting a ring
laser gyro inertial system, either a Honeywell H-423 or Litton LN-93.
The standard fit FMS OCU aircraft
will carry an ALE-40 chaff/flare dispenser and the older USAF standard
ALR-69, which is a modified ALR-45 digital radar warning system with added
SAM launch command link warning receiver. The presence of antenna scabs on
photographed aircraft indicates the TNI-AU aircraft are so equipped. There is
no internal defensive ECM, but provisions for the ALQ-131 exist in the
standard FMS OCU configuration.
The APG-66 is a modest air intercept
radar. It uses a slotted planar array antenna with 32.6 dB gain in its
nominal I/J band operating range, with peak sidelobes at -31 dB in azimuth
and -26dB in elevation. The radar is a two stage superhet with intermediate
frequencies of 670 MHz and 56 MHz, the lower frequency is digitised and
handled by a programmable signal processor. The radar is pulse Doppler with
low, medium and high PRFs selected for varying target/engagement geometries.
The APG-66 has nominal range of up to 80 NM, with an azimuth scan out to +/-
60 degrees.
The OCU upgrades to the radar include
a facility to slave the seekers of the all aspect AIM-9P-4 Sidewinder to the
antenna boresight for dogfight acquisition, and facilities for datalink
control of Amraam and alternately, if fitted, can support a continuous wave
illuminator for the AIM-7 Sparrow (or similar CW SARH missile). The radar's
basic air-air search modes are Uplook and Downlook Search, the latter
providing for the the detection of fighter size targets in clutter at 29 NM
or better. There are several acquisition modes. Manual modes are Single
Target Track and Situation Awareness (STT combined with track while scan on
remaining targets), automatic modes comprise four Air Combat Manoeuvring
(ACM) modes. These provide for HUD acquisition, vertical acquisition,
boresight acquisition and a slewable 60x20 scan acquisition (modes not unlike
those in the APG-65).
Air to ground modes include real beam
groundmap, Doppler beam sharpening, ranging, beacon tracking and sea search.
These are used to support a range of air-ground delivery modes, including
CCIP, Dive Toss and CCRP, with a CEP reported better than 100 ft for low
level HUD aimed delivery of unguided munitions.
What this yields is essentially
little difference from the early TAC standard F-16A with the low thrust
engine. The aircraft is a capable VFR dogfighter with limited IFR air
intercept capability, and good VFR capability as a tactical strike aircraft.
The limited electronic warfare fit and absence of night vision and
designation capability restricts the aircraft's usefulness in the strike role
to daylight operations under VFR conditions, in low density environments. The
AIM-9P-4 (see TE on Sidewinder) is a Sidewinder with limited aerodynamic
manoeuvre performance by virtue of older actuator and engine design, and is
inferior to the AIM-9L/M used by the USAF/USN and RAAF. Reports indicate the
TNI-AU is interested in acquiring a BVR SARH missile such as the Sparrow or
the Skyflash, both types being compatible with the radar should the
illuminator be fitted. The lack of such capability will seriously restrict
the TNI-AU's capability to stop low level penetrators under IFR/night
conditions and is a major weakness in their air defence capability.
The radius performance of the
F-16A-15 OCU is similar to that of the F/A-18A and is understandably
sensitive to payload and profile. Useful payloads on Hi-Lo-Hi profiles are
deliverable out to about 500 NM, the absence of PGM capability is in this
context a major failing as it forces heavier payloads and hence limits radius
to about 300 NM with 3,000 lb of Mk.82, or slightly better on lesser payload.
Recent reports from overseas, yet to
be confirmed, suggest that the ongoing RENSTRA 5 force development plan will
see the acquisition of further F-16s, for a target force of 36 single seaters
and 12 two seaters, seeing also the phasing out of the F-5 force. Whether
financial constraints allow this to happen remains to be seen.
The other supersonic type in the
TNI-AU inventory is the venerable Northrop F-5E Tiger II, the US FMS export
fighter of the seventies. Powered by a pair of 5,000 lb afterburning
J85-GE-21A turbojets, the F-5E is a useful lightweight point defence fighter
with excellent handling characteristics. It is however a truly defensive
aircraft due its very limited radius performance and rudimentary weapon
system.
The core of the aircraft's weapon
system is a lightweight Emerson Electric APQ-153 or in later aircraft,
APQ-159 radar. The radar is coupled to an ASG-29 or 31 lead computing optical
sight, to support attacks with the aircraft's two Pontiac M-39A-2 20 mm
cannon, with 280 RPG, or with a pair of wingtip mounted AIM-9P-3 or P-4 AAMs.
The radar is very limited in lookdown performance and target handling
capacity, and provides a quoted 20 NM detection range.
It is unclear whether the TNI-AU
aircraft carry the ALR-46 RWR and ALE-40 dispenser fitted to many FMS export
F-5Es. The evidence of such a fit would lie in the scab antenna covers on the
forward fuselage. The ALR-46 would provide a useful and adequate warning
capability for the aircraft's role.
The F-5E is no match for a teen
series fighter or a Fulcrum in a dogfight environment, while its poor
thrust/weight ratio and small wing severely restrict its capability as an
interdictor, in any event limited to daylight/VFR strikes. With a meaningful
payload of 5,000 lb the F-5E is limited to a radius of 120 NM, with a
marginally useful load of 1,000 lb (ie 2 x Mk.82) it can range to about 500
NM. The limited accuracy and payload of this type renders its utility outside
the point defence role as questionable.
The most useful type by virtue of
numbers and radius performance in the TNI-AU inventory is Ed Heinemann's
classic, the Douglas A-4. With two squadrons it is the most numerous fast jet
in the inventory, most aircraft are reportedly ex-USN A-4Es saved from the
graveyard, with the dual airframes ex-Israeli TA-4Hs refurbished in the US.
While the TNI-AU's Skyhawks are
universally listed as A-4Es, they are fitted with the avionic 'hump'
characteristic of the later A-4F, which suggests either a custom nav-attack
upgrade which has not been publicised, or the aircraft are in fact A-4Fs or
ex-Israeli A-4Hs, the identity of which has been concealed for political
reasons.
The differences between these Skyhawk
models are not substantial, all are fitted with versions of the P&W J52 turbojet,
either the 8,500 lb P-6A in the E-model, or 9,300 lb P-8A in the F-model and
H-model. All A-4s will deliver a useful payload of several thousand pounds
beyond 400 NM with a pair of 300 USG tanks, as evidenced in the Falklands.
The A-4 is rugged and manoeuvrable, with good tolerance for battle damage,
and is easily maintained in the field.
Nothing has been published in the
open literature about the avionic fit in the TNI-AU's A-4 fleet. The avionic
hump suggests a fit similar to late model USN A-4s, with APN-153 Doppler nav
equipment, ASN-41 navigation/attack computer and AVQ-24 HUD or possibly
earlier lead computing gunsight. This would limit these aircraft to day VFR
or limited IFR strike capability. It is possible the aircraft retained their
USN standard early model ALR-45 warning receivers and ALE-39 dispensers, both
of which would provide a minimal defensive capability. The A-4 typically did
not carry defensive ECM, although some dedicated USN aircraft were wired for
AGM-45 Shrike anti-radiation missiles.
The A-4 provides a respectable VFR
strike capability at a useful radius, however the aircraft's limited avionic
suite will restrict its ability to deliver accurately under poor weather
conditions, while its performance means that fighter escort will be required
in contested airspace.
Supplementing the A-4 in the strike
role is the Hawk Mk.53, a combat capable fast jet trainer, which serves in
either role. The Hawk 53 force was acquired in the early eighties as an
advanced jet trainer with a secondary combat role. As such, the aircraft is a
respectable performer on a limited 5,300 lb powerplant. Lacking radar and
precision nav/attack the Mk.53s are limited to daylight/VFR strike
operations, similarly in comparison to the later Hawk 100/200 series the
smaller 122 USG gallon drop tanks confer a lesser strike radius, about 300 NM
on 2,000 lb of warload. It is unclear whether the TNI-AU's airframes are
wired for AIM-9, similarly the absence of the vertical tail mounted warning
receiver housings suggests these are not fitted, thus the aircraft are
unlikely to survive well without fighter cover.
The Hawk 53 and A-4 will be replaced
during the nineties by domestically assembled Hawk 100 and 200 aircraft,
although at the time of writing the situation had not been finalised. The
Hawk 100 offers slightly better payload radius than the earlier models, and
when fitted with warning receivers and suitable nav attack is a useful
lightweight strike aircraft. The single seat Hawk 200 is fitted with a
lightweight APG-66H radar and has further increased payload and takeoff
weight.
The TNI-AU is a force unable to
defend its own airspace against a well equipped attacker, due to limitations
in the number and capability of tactical aircraft. This is a limitation which
will not change with the acquisition of additional fighter aircraft or armed
trainers, to acquire a credible air defence and strike capability more air
superiority and interdiction aircraft will be required, and the support of a
substantial tanker and AEW&C capability will be needed, given the
geography of the archipelago.
The TNI-AL
The TNI-AL is Indonesia's fleet air
arm. Concentrated at the major naval facility in Surabaya, the TNI-AL deploys
in flights to support naval operations away from the home base. The
Indonesian navy is a shadow of the force it was in the Sukarno days, and is a
true brown water navy structured about frigates, fast attack boats and patrol
boats.
The TNI-AL can be divided into a
fixed wing and rotary wing component. The fixed wing component is comprised
of two operational squadrons, 800 tasked with maritime recce and equipped
with Nomads and CN-235Ms and 600 tasked with transport flying a mix of types,
and a single fixed wing training unit which flies several Pipers. The Nomads
and CN-235Ms deploy from Surabaya to Tanjung Pinang and Manado for forward
operations. In the longer term the fixed wing component will be comprised of
the CN-235MPA, a dedicated MR version with APS-504 surface search radar, GEC
Flir, Sky Guardian ESM and Trimble TRL 7900 GPS/nav.
The rotary wing element of the TNI-AL
is somewhat more potent. The single combat squadron, 400 Sqn, flies a mix of
geriatric Wasp HAS.1 ASW helos and a growing force of new Pumas and Super
Pumas. The Wasps were acquired from the Netherlands and are usually deployed
on the TNI-AL's frigates, nine of which are known to be air capable. The
TNI-AL operates a total of 13 frigates, 3 are ex-Netherlands Leanders (Van
Speijk), 3 are 1970s built Exocet equipped Fatahillah class boats, supplied
by the Netherlands, another three are air capable Tiyahahu class and four are
ex-US Samadikun class vessels. Recent reports suggest that the TNI-AL is
seeking no less than 20 new build frigates to replace the existing vessels,
and further LSTs and patrol boats, all under the RENSTRA 5 force development
program.
The frigate force would support
amphibious operations by no less than 15 LSTs, many of which are capable of
embarking the Puma or Super Puma for ship to shore assault.
The Super Pumas are the pride of the
TNI-AL, with the service planning to acquire no less than 22 in total. The
radar equipped Super Pumas perform a primary role of surface attack with
AM.39 Exocet, with secondary roles of ASW, assault and SAR, in the latter
roles supplemented by four older Pumas. A second rotary wing squadron, 200
Sqn, provides transport and liaison services with the Bo.105 utility helo.
The TNI-AU is well equipped for its
primary role of supporting army amphibious operations in the Indonesian
archipelago, with its force structure of frigates, fast attack craft and
amphibious assault vessels. Its weakness is a lack of substantial air defence
capability which renders it highly susceptible to air attack. by suitably
equipped opponents.
The TNI-AD
The TNI-AD is Indonesia's land army,
by far the largest of the nation's three services with about 200,000
personnel. The army has by regional standards a respectable airlift
capability, although in the context of the nation's geography it is rather
modest.
Fixed wing capability is split
between a mixed force of about a dozen smaller twins, and twenty or so single
engine observation types, mostly PZL-104s. The rotary wing force is larger,
with Bell 205A-1 and Bell 412 providing the airmobile assault capability,
with a small number of domestically built Bo.105 equipped as fire support
gunships with rocket pods or guns.
The army has no heavy lift capability
and relies wholly upon the air force for handling heavier payloads. Unit
allocations of the helicopter force have not been publicised in the open
literature.
Summary
As noted earlier, the Indonesian
archipelago is the geographical path via which any adversary intent upon
invading Australia must approach. However, objectives lesser than invasion
can be satisfied by the occupation of Sumatra and parts of Java, such as
cutting the principal shipping channels between the Indian Ocean and the Far
East. While these may be accomplished in the context of grander geopolitical
objectives, they would be a serious threat to Australia's economic well
being, in that a large proportion of the air and sea traffic to this
continent passes through Indonesian territory.
Therefore the defence of Indonesia is
as strategically important to Australia as is the immediate defence of the
continent. While the Indonesian military is substantial in numbers, it is a
force structured largely for purposes of internal security, evidenced by the
types in service and their deployment. Indonesia is a nation not unlike the
defunct Yugoslavia, and is held intact by force where deemed necessary, as
evidenced by recent events in Timor. Timor is such a sensitive issue with the
Indonesians, largely as they perceive the independence movement in Timor as
communist, and hence a threat to the nation's security on a grander scale.
Whether this perception is accurate is open to debate.
What is certain is that Indonesia has
a very limited capacity to project air power beyond 500 NM of its national
boundaries, definitely in any situation where airspace is contested by a
serious opponent. What this suggests is that such an opponent could rapidly
cripple the TNI-AU and TNI-AL and thereafter enjoy substantial freedom of
movement in the archipelago, securing only those objectives required to
attain the desired strategic position, for instance cutting shipping and air
lanes in the region.
Australia would have substantial
difficulty in rendering assistance under such circumstances, or in protecting
its strategic interests, depending on which perspective one takes. This is
because existing air capabilities have been developed toward the objective of
stopping the opponent in the air-sea gap to the North, and no further out. As
a result the RAAF has not been given the inflight refuelling capability
required to contest the outer regional air/sea battle. While the government
will argue that forward basing at Butterworth is the answer, one must
seriously question the rationality of basing high value assets in an area
which would be within the reach of hostile strike aircraft. That would be an
open invitation.
Forward basing at Cocos or at sites
in Java would be a better proposition, as deployed assets could be kept out
of the range of hostile tactical air, and with tanker support could contest
the outer regional air/sea battle. However, a more substantial tanker
capability will be required, including boom refuelling to allow the F-111 (or
its eventual successor) to fully exploit its potential. The RAAF's existing
tanker force is by all means a step in the right direction, but it is too small
to provide support concurrently for 90+ tactical aircraft, and cannot support
the F-111 or our regional neighbours' (Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand) F-16
forces. Fitting existing tankers with booms and acquiring further tankers
would substantially extend the RAAF's reach and combat persistence at a
distance, thus allowing it to spearhead any regional air offensive against a
hostile outside party, while also providing the means of stretching the
combat radius of other useful regional air assets.
Command, control and communications
(C3) become another issue in this context, as the control of a composite
multinational force is not a trivial task by any means. The underdeveloped
communications and radar early warning infrastructure in the region dictates
the use of AEW&C aircraft supplemented by airborne command posts, both
assets which are hard to hit and can be moved at very short notice. Having
such assets, the latter perhaps located onboard some of the tankers, would
provide for the rapid assembly, deployment and coordinated combat utilisation
of a composite RAAF/regional air capability. Training together over a period
of time would provide a better mutual insight among all participants, which
would have to prove of long term usefulness.
One must seriously question whether
the money spent on regional aid programs wouldn't be better spent on putting
together a multinational capability as outlined in this discussion, the
usefulness of existing programs in any collective crisis situation is open to
discussion. Spending the same money on interoperable communications equipment
and inflight refuelling assets makes far better sense. By the same token
AEW&C makes better sense than OTHB radar, in that it can be moved to a
hot spot, rather than have to wait for the hot spot to move to it.
Australian politicians should
seriously consider where the money is spent, in that a domestic program to
provide a substantial tanker and AEW&C capability would create much
needed jobs in high technology, high value added industries, and reduce the
flow of defence dollars overseas.
The central issue is whether
Australia should indulge in the luxury of regional isolationism, and
structure its capabilities to repel would be invaders at its very front door,
or whether it should structure its capabilities to form the backbone of a
larger composite regional force. In the region only Australia has the air
capability, technical expertise and political position to perform such a
role. Assuming such a leadership position would serve Australia's interests
by extending the reach of its offensive capability to engage invaders at a
geographically advantageous position, while providing for a much closer
relationship with our immediate neighbours.
Whether Australians and Indonesians
choose to like each other is irrelevant. We need their geographical position
and they need our offensive air capability and expertise. The sooner this is
recognised and wholly accepted by both nations, the better. While many
Indonesians and Australians perceive the two nations as potential
adversaries, the reality is that posturing of this kind only serves the
interests of those who wish to resources away from defence, by creating the
image of a mutual threat with no serious credibility to it.
Australia has traditionally suffered
the dilemma of structuring its capabilities without having a clearly defined
threat. This has led to an ill defined sense of direction and force
structure, which has in turn provided ample opportunity for the disarmament
lobbies inside and outside the DoD to resources and inhibit the development
of necessary capabilities. Adopting a policy direction and strategy via which
the ADF assumes a central role in a composite regional force structure will
provide a central set of objectives for force development which would in no
way diminish Australia's ability to defend itself closer to home. This
approach would also serve to quash the 'don't get this capability because it
will upset our neighbours' argument, which has often interfered in force
structure development in highly unproductive ways.
The Gulf War proved the viability of
the composite multinational force structure and demonstrated what problems
will occur, be they organisational, cross-cultural or political. In spite of
these obstacles the campaign was a stunning success with the active
participation of some very diverse air forces and aircraft. The unifying
element was the cohesive C3 structure, supported by key technological assets,
ie a large US/UK tanker force and USAF AWACS which served as command posts.
In the this fashion, the USAF and to some degree the RAF formed the backbone
of the multinational force.
In the regional context Australia is
best equipped to perform such a role, as it has many of the key assets
required in place, with others planned for eventual acquisition. What is
required is a fundamental change in how we approach the region, and a serious
long term commitment to build up the necessary capabilities on the scale
required. The world has seen more changes in fundamental strategic
relationships in the last 2 years than in the previous 50 years, and
Australia should not fall behind in adapting to the new world order.
Isolationism is not the answer.
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